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1 Introduction
American postsecondary education is a highly unique and interesting industry. It shares characteristics with
a wide variety of other markets but has several aspects unique to it. Like most businesses, institutions of
higher education provide goods and services to paying customers. However, these goods and services are
complex. Consumers pay for many goods and services that are all bundled together as the single "good" of
education. Like other personal service industries, educational institutions employ knowledgeable professionals
whose knowledge is the good itself. Unlike these other industries, this knowledge is directly passed on to
consumers rather than merely used to accomplish a speciﬁed task. In addition, education is a good that is
consumed over a long period of time and is rarely an end in itself. It is usually an investment for future use
in the job market and in life.
The demand side of higher education is also worth noting. Consumers of higher education are not the
standard buyer. These consumers are typically younger and, for many, are just leaving the nest for the
ﬁrst time. Their tuition costs are rarely paid for entirely through self-funding. A combination of grants,
scholarships, loans, personal ﬁnances, and help from home typically go toward funding students' education.
Colleges also fund their operations in a variety of ways. Like most non-proﬁt and public institutions
in other markets, colleges and universities have access to diverse revenue streams. In addition to tuition
revenues, institutions of higher learning also receive government contracts and appropriations, donations and
endowments, and auxiliary revenues from school-ran outside enterprises, such as hospitals. Also like most
public and non-proﬁt institutions in other ﬁelds, most postsecondary schools cannot distribute proﬁts to
owners. This is because the ﬁeld is largely dominated by public and non-proﬁt institutions. This makes
having a variety of revenue sources even more interesting because all of those revenues will go directly back
into running the institution.
All of the above factors make higher education a ﬁeld worth studying. This has become especially true
lately due to a number of developing trends. Over the past couple of decades, costs in higher education have
been skyrocketing. In particular, the last decade has seen massive increases in tuition at most higher education
institutions. (Desrochers et. al, 2009) There has been much literature and research done on this worrisome
trend in recent years. The works range from trying to explain the cost increases to policy suggestions and
the creation of cost and revenue accountability metrics. The methods vary widely, but the type that caught
my eye relied on the diverse revenue streams available to institutions of higher education. While I do not
seek to explain cost increases speciﬁcally, I will attempt to link costs and revenues. In particular, I want to
model spending as a function of diﬀerent types of revenue sources.
In conjunction with these cost increases, there have been rising tensions between parties advocating for
expansion in the ﬁeld of research and those advocating for the traditional mission of providing high quality
education. (Desrochers et. al, 2010) These tensions are particularly strong at four year research institutions.
The Carnegie Foundation classiﬁes an institution as a research school if a substantial portion of activities are
research related. (Carnegie Foundation, 2012) These institutions already engage in large amounts of research,
and the trend has been an increasing proportion of total spending going toward research. (Desrochers et. al,
2010) This "mission drift," which will be discussed more extensively later, has been a point of contention in
recent years.
There are multiple reasons for an institution to engage in research. For example, high powered research
draws attention and prestige to an institution. It also acts as an attraction for highly skilled and nationally
regarded professors and researchers. Then there are the potential revenue beneﬁts. Private donors and
businesses might want to support a school that engages in a particular kind or level of research. The federal,
state, and local governments are also interested in advancing research, and provide lucrative contracts to
institutions that engage in such research. These pressures increase the diﬃculty for institutions choosing
between spending on education and spending on research.
This paper looks at one aspect of this research-education tension. The focus is on how diverse revenue
streams and revenue driven incentives aﬀect four year research institution spending decisions when it comes
to research and education related expenses. The goal is not to ﬁnd the optimal amount of education and
research spending. The main task here is to better understand how changes in revenue structures aﬀect
spending decisions at four year research institutions. This will be done theoretically and then with regression
analysis. The ﬁnal product is a set of linear regressions that estimates spending on research and education
as functions of the diﬀerent possible revenue sources for these institutions. These regressions can then be
used to estimate spending under speciﬁc conditions and to analyze what happens to education and research
spending when revenue structures change. In this paper, I will focus on the latter use of the regressions. I
will also pay special attention to any diﬀerences over time and any diﬀerences between public and non-proﬁt
institutions. The regressions will be constructed in order to highlight possible diﬀerences. I conclude that
non-proﬁts and public institutions behave diﬀerently when it comes to revenues and education and research
spending, and this leads non-proﬁts to be more insulated from the mission drift associated with increased
research spending relative to education.
It should be noted that this is not a policy paper. There will be no prescriptions for how to ease the
education-research tension, nor any opinion as to how institutions should structure expenditures. However,
the hope is that the metrics and analysis provided here can aid institutions, future researchers, and policy
makers in making these decisions. It is also my desire for this piece to contribute to the literature on
diﬀerences between the diﬀerent sectors in mixed markets.
As a guideline for what will come, here is a brief outline of the paper. In the second section, brief back-
grounds on non-proﬁts and the ﬁeld of higher will be given. Relevant literature will be reviewed throughout
the section. The section will ﬁnish with a theoretical discussion of the relationship between revenue streams
and expenditures and the development of a utility maximization model to explain and predict such relation-
ships. The third section discusses the statistical methods I used in my analysis. The methodology is developed
and the data I used is described in detail. In section four, the results of my linear regression analysis are
presented. Particular emphasis is put on describing and explaining diﬀerences in regression coeﬃcients over
time and between non-proﬁt and public institutions. The ﬁfth section is a brief discussion of the implications
of the results section. The sixth section is the conclusion.
2 Background and Theory
Before I launch into the econometric portion of my thesis, I will give some theoretical background. There are
three parts here. First, I will discuss non-proﬁt theory as it relates to my paper. Next, I will give background
on the higher education ﬁeld, its similarities to non-proﬁts, and its unique aspects. Finally, there will be a
discussion of what the theory tells us and what claims arise. In this section, relevant previous works will be
discussed as it is necessary.
2.1 Non-proﬁt Theory
Non-proﬁt organizations have a long history in the ﬁeld of economics. There are many deﬁnitions and deﬁning
characteristics of non-proﬁts. The deﬁnition I will use is that a non-proﬁt is any private organization that is
subject to the non-distribution constraint. This means that these institutions voluntarily give up their ability
to distribute excess proﬁts to owners. (Frumkin, 2002) The moniker of non-proﬁt is often confusing for this
reason. Non-proﬁts can generate proﬁt just like any typical for-proﬁt business; they just cannot distribute
that excess proﬁt. Owners get ﬁxed, predetermined compensation.
This leads to the question of why any institution would voluntarily do this. The simple answer is that
the deﬁnition of non-proﬁt is both a legal and tax-based provision. That is, non-proﬁts are provided special
tax beneﬁts if they follow the appropriate laws. These beneﬁts typically come in three varieties. First, all
non-proﬁts are not taxed on revenues that are directly related to their missions. This includes sources such
as donations or sale of mission-related goods and services. (Frumkin, 2002) For example, a non-proﬁt might
have the mission of providing cheap healthcare to underprivileged families. Any revenues that this company
generates through the sale of healthcare will not be taxed.
The second potential beneﬁt is that many non-proﬁts receive other tax breaks. For example, many
institutions do not pay local property or sales tax. (Salamon, 1999) The third beneﬁt applies to a special
class of non-proﬁts. Institutions in this category are referred to by the title of the portion of the tax code
in which they are deﬁned, 501 (c)(3). These 501 (c)(3) organizations can receive tax-deductible donations.
Donors to such an organization get the dollar amount of their donation deducted from their taxable income.
This increases the incentive to donate to 501 (c)(3)'s because the government essentially pays part of the
donation in the form of a tax deduction. (Salamon, 1999)
There are also many non-tax beneﬁts to being non-proﬁt, such as being considered more trustworthy
by consumers and having access to diverse revenue streams. (Weisbrod, 1988) There is extensive economic
literature that describes in detail these non-tax beneﬁts. For my purposes, I will only discuss revenue streams.
Non-proﬁts have access to sources of revenue that are typically closed to their for-proﬁt counterparts. In
particular, non-proﬁts receive donations and government funding and contracts. For-proﬁts can legally receive
this kind of revenue, but rarely do. (Weisbrod, 1988) These extra revenue sources often make non-proﬁt
organizations more ﬂexible than for-proﬁts. For instance, if a non-proﬁt college is down on enrollment, it can
appeal to the government and donors for additional funds. It can also rely on endowments and stockpiled
funds. A for-proﬁt college in the same situation would have far fewer recourses.
Despite the beneﬁts of having access to diverse revenue streams, there are some consequences. One of the
most well documented problems is that of mission drift. This typically occurs when a non-proﬁt "follows the
money". That is, a non-proﬁt does something uncharacteristic in relation to its mission in order to obtain
funds. (Scheitle, 2009) For example, an environmental group that advocates an immediate switch away
from gasoline as fuel may change its opinion to a more gasoline and coal friendly view in order to receive
government funding. The ability to control revenue sources partly allows this kind of diversion of mission to
occur.
One example of an empirical study of mission drift comes from Scheitle (2009). He considers a form of
mission drift for Christian non-proﬁts. He is interested in showing whether receiving government funds aﬀects
the stated identity of Christian non-proﬁts. Scheitle uses variables such as statement of religious identity and
the religious strength of words used in the mission statement as measures of Christian identity. He compares
government funded institutions with institutions that do not receive government funds. This is particularly
interesting for me because I am comparing public and non-proﬁt institutions in higher education. Although
both types receive government funding, public institutions receive far more government funds.
Scheitle carries out his comparison using logistic regression. He concludes that expressed religiousness
has a negative relationship with government funding. In other words, institutions with stronger religious
identities tend to not receive government funds. In particular, the coeﬃcient for references to God is -1.7,
the coeﬃcient for references to Jesus Christ is -1.12, and the coeﬃcient for use of any religious key word is
-0.617. It should be noted that this conclusion does not imply that receipt of government funding changes
religious identity or vice versa. Scheitle looks speciﬁcally at this by considering 20 transition institutions,
those that did not receive government funding before 2002 but received it after. He ﬁnds that 85 percent
of these institutions did not change their religious identity over the time period. He also notes that these
institutions had more inclusive religious identities to begin with. Scheitle concludes that some underlying
factor explains both religious identity and the relative amount of government funds received for Christian
non-proﬁts.
This piece is useful to me for two reasons. First, Scheitle compares two institution types that are diﬀerent
based on level of government funding. I am also comparing institution types, non-proﬁt and public in higher
education. In addition, public research universities tend to receive more government funding. Just as Scheitle
hypothesized, I believe that this diﬀerence will change the behavior of public institutions relative to non-
proﬁts. The second reason this piece is important is that it helped me with my statistical model. Although
I am not doing a logistic regression, I am performing a regression that relates mission to some underlying
structure of the institutions. In my case, mission is measured by spending on education and research, and
the underlying structure is manifested by the revenue structures of public and non-proﬁt institutions.
2.2 Higher Education
As suggested by its name, the higher education industry is in the business of providing postsecondary ed-
ucation to paying customers. Like businesses in any other industry, colleges and universities buy factors of
production in order to sell goods and services. However, there are many unique aspects to the industry. One
interesting characteristic of higher education is the presence of an atypical market structure. On the surface,
the market shares some similarities with the usual proﬁt maximizing market structure. Higher education is
highly competitive on both the demand and supply sides. Institutions seek to diﬀerentiate themselves from
each other through advertising, increasing quality and quantity, and specialization. The major diﬀerence,
however, is that this competition is not underscored by the pursuit of proﬁt. (Clotfelter, 1996) Institutions
battle for prestige, pride, and revenues. Competition is fueled by these pursuits as well as the simple notion
that a lack of funding, whether it comes from students, the government, Aunt Marge's hefty donations, or
investment returns, will lead to institution failure and bankruptcy. This worry exists for for-proﬁts as well,
but it is typically encompassed by the pursuit of proﬁts. If a company is making a proﬁt, then it will avoid
closure.
Another major structural diﬀerence is the presence of a concrete mission for public and non-proﬁt insti-
tutions. At for-proﬁt companies, the major goal is proﬁt, even though other goals may exist. Since public
and non-proﬁt institutions cannot be proﬁt-maximizers, they must have some other reason for existing. This
reason is their mission. In higher education an institution's stated mission deals heavily with its key product,
education. (Desrochers et. al, 2009) This is true of public and non-proﬁt institutions across the sector.
In recent years, much more emphasis has been placed on research. This is especially true at research
institutions. Such institutions put a signiﬁcant proportion of their spending into research, and this proportion
has been recently increasing. (Desrochers, et. al, 2009) With the rapid advancements in technology over the
last couple decades, especially in computer technology, many research projects that were computationally or
temporally prohibitive are now doable. This has increased the demand for high powered research by both the
public sector and the private business sector. (Desrochers et. al, 2010) Just as with non-proﬁts, the higher
education industry is subject to mission drift. In this case, the drift is largely considered to be away from
education and toward research. I hope to display this mission drift and the components of it by statistically
linking revenues to education and research spending and then considering diﬀerences in revenue structures
over time and between non-proﬁt and public institutions.
Another unique aspect of higher education is the nature of the good being sold. As mentioned in the
introduction, higher education is a complex good. The provision of this "good" involves many inputs as
well as outputs. Classes, lab classes, Room and board, athletics, clubs, community service opportunities,
and assorted educational opportunities are all often considered part of the college experience. Academic
buildings, dormitories, professors, laboratories, coaches, athletic and dining facilities, and plenty of faculty
and staﬀ extra hours are needed to provide all of these aspects of the educational experience.
As a result educational institutions have a wide variety of spending categories. At the same time, revenue
streams are diverse because the higher education industry is dominated by public and non-proﬁt institutions.
These institution control types allow for other forms of revenue generation besides the typical sale of goods
and services. (Salamon, 1999) This leaves colleges and universities with a slew of choices to make. Institutions
need to ﬁgure out what to spend money on and how much to spend. They also can decide how to structure
revenues eﬀectively and eﬃciently in order to achieve spending goals. The rest of this paper focuses on this
interplay between revenue and cost decisions.
In order to proceed with the theoretical and econometric analysis, a framework must be set. This frame-
work largely comes from Desrochers et. al (2009). The authors of this paper seek to increase cost account-
ability in higher education. To do this, they consider revenue and cost categories and decision making.
Each category is based on the well-known measure of full-time equivalent (FTE) student. FTE measures the
eﬀective number of students at an institution. Each spending and revenue category is measured per FTE
student. University spending is broken up into ﬁve categories: education, research, public service, auxiliary
spending, and scholarships and fellowships. The revenue categories are tuition, state and local appropriations,
government contracts, auxiliary revenues, and private donations and endowments. These categories will be
described in greater detail in the Models section below.
Desrochers et. al (2009) use these spending and revenue categories to discuss trends in higher education
and the consequences that result. They begin by considering revenue sources and trends. They do this
because revenues drive costs and "dictate functionality in higher education." (Desrochers et. al, 2009) This
is what is called the "revenue theory of costs." This theory, ﬁrst articulated by Howard Bowen, states that
overall spending levels and spending decisions are dictated by revenue structures. (Archibald and Feldman,
2008) In light of this, Desrochers et. al link revenues to costs.
The revenue trends that the authors articulate are summarized below. General revenues diﬀer by institu-
tion control type. Public institutions receive most of their general revenues from government appropriations
and tuition while non-proﬁts rely on tuition and private donations and endowments. In addition, tuition
in public institutions is often used as a recovery mechanism when state funding is cut. Public institutions
increase tuition in order to oﬀset budget declines in other areas. Government contracts are typically restricted
revenues that are largely for public service or speciﬁed research. Auxiliary revenues come from school oper-
ated self revenue generating enterprises, such as hospitals and bookstores. These revenues are typically not
available for general use by the institution because they are poured back into the auxiliary enterprise.
For cost trends, Desrochers et. al consider a wide variety of cost measures. I am interested in those for
education and research related expenses, so I will describe those here. The ﬁrst major trend is that non-proﬁt
research schools spend far more per FTE student than public schools. In 2006, the level was over double
with non-proﬁts spending $64,000 per FTE student on average and public institutions only spending $31,000.
The second trend is that research spending is on the rise in both public and non-proﬁt institutions. Between
2002 and 2006, not only did research spending increase, it increased more than any other category for both
public and non-proﬁt research institutions.
The ﬁnal set of trends deals with spending as it relates to tuition. The most important occurrence here
is that tuition increases outpaced education spending increases for both non-proﬁt and public institutions.
Desrochers et. al argue that this implies that all institutions, regardless of control type, "are becoming more
dependent on tuition as a source of general revenue." This includes not just revenues used for education
spending, but those used for research spending and other spending categories as well. In addition, the
tuition increases relative to education spending increases were far larger at public institutions. From 2002
to 2006, tuition increased 29.8 percent at public schools while education spending went up only 2.5 percent.
Non-proﬁts, on the other hand, saw similarly sized increases in both tuition and education spending. These
increases were 12.6 and 9.1 percent respectively. I will test these cost-revenue relationships statistically.
I used the above framework and assumptions in three ways. The revenue and spending categories are ﬁrst
used to create an economic model, introduced below, that looks at the relationships between revenues and
costs. Next, the trends that Desrochers et. al analyzed are the basis for a theoretical discussion of diﬀerences
over time and between non-proﬁts and public institutions. Finally, I took two of the spending categories,
education and research, and for each, I created multiple linear regressions with the ﬁve revenue variables as
independent variables. I hope to test some of the relationships discussed in Desrochers et. al (2009), as well
as discover some new trends.
2.3 An Economic Model
The econometrics portion of this paper seeks to quantify the previously discussed relationships between
spending and revenue structures. In particular, the focus will be on education and research spending. The
goal is to gain insight into the education-research tension that has been developing in higher education.
Econometrics is helpful in that it can give us tangible numerical approximations for the possible relationships
between spending on education and research and the diﬀerent revenue categories described previously. Still,
this is not the only method. To fully understand the questions at hand, let's ﬁrst see what we can glean from
economic theory and mathematical economics. To do this, I will develop a simple economic model based on
utility maximization.
Consider the spending decisions of some research university. As mentioned above, this institution can
spend money in ﬁve diﬀerent categories: education, research, public service, auxiliary expenses, and schol-
arships and fellowships. Since my statistical analysis will focus on research and education, I will simplify
the economic model and consider just these two expenditure categories. Thus, the college can buy units
of research or units of education. Notice that the language here is in terms of consumer, not producer,
choice. Technically, the institution is buying the means to provide education and research opportunities
to consumers (i.e. students, faculty, visiting faculty), but for simpliﬁcation, I will view the university as a
utility-maximizing consumer itself.
The utility maximization approach makes sense when you think in terms of the institution's mission. Re-
search colleges, whether public or private, seek to provide high quality education and high-powered research
opportunities. We can think of spending on education and research as a proxy for this mission. The more an
institution spends on one of the categories, the more it can provide of this category, and better quality can
also be provided. This leads to a greater ability to fulﬁll the mission. Since the non-distribution constraint
is in eﬀect, the institution can be viewed as a "mission maximizer" and not a proﬁt maximizer. If we think
of satisfying the mission as providing utility to the institution, we have a standard utility maximization
problem. Furthermore, we have a constrained utility maximization problem because the institution is subject
to a budget constraint. Speciﬁcally, the constraint is total revenue, which we can break down into the ﬁve
revenue categories mentioned above. This gives us the following utility maximization problem:
max
{(E,R)}
U(E,R) subject to M = pEE + pRR,
where U(E,R) is the instition's utility function, E is units of education, R is units of research, pE is the price
of a unit of education, pR is the price of a unit of research, and M is total revenue. We can separate M into
its components using the equation: M = X1 +X2 +X3 +X4 +X5 where each Xi for i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} is one
of the ﬁve revenue categories.
We can introduce some assumptions into this model based on standard economic theory and higher
education theory. First, we expect all prices to be positive and all revenue variables to be positive. Since all
research institutions provide at least some research and education, we will assume positive interior solutions
to the problem. In addition, we assume that we have a nice utility function. That is, we have a utility function
that exhibits positive but diminishing marginal returns with respect to education and research. The ﬁrst
part of this assumption is justiﬁed by the fact that research and education are goods. An increase in either
will increase the institution's ability to satisfy its mission, which increases its utility. Diminishing marginal
returns makes sense as an assumption due to the nature of a "unit" of education or research. A unit includes
purchases such as professor salaries, new lab materials, and building upkeep. In most cases, these goods and
services exhibit diminishing marginal utility. For instance, the increase in educational quality and quantity
provided by hiring the ﬁrst professor is likely to be much larger than the increase provided by hiring the one
hundredth professor.
Our ﬁnal assumption is that the mixed partial derivative of utility with respect to education and research
is positive. That is, ∂
2U
∂R∂E = UER > 0. In plain terms this means that having more units of research
increases the amount of utility that an additional unit of education provides and vice versa. The basis
for this assumption goes back to Nerlove (1972). He argues that education and research are complements in
production. This is equivalent to my assumption because I deﬁne increased utility by an increase in the ability
to provide education and research (i.e. the output of the production function for an institution). Nerlove's
argument is that the resources for education, such as libraries, collections of scholarly works, and labs, are
also necessary for research. In addition, Nerlove states that many introductory courses at big research schools
are taught by the very same people doing the research because this teaching informs and improves research.
In this sense, education and research are complementary.
With the model framework set, we can start our theoretic analysis. In particular, we want to ﬁnd out
how changes in the diﬀerent revenue categories aﬀect spending on research and education. With the above
assumptions we can actually use comparative statics on the ﬁrst order conditions for Lagrangian maximization
in order to sign:
∂E
∂Xi
and
∂R
∂Xi
for each i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}.
The associated Lagrangian for this maximization problem is:
L(E,R, λ) = U(E,R) + λ(X1 +X2 +X3 +X4 +X5 − pEE − pRR),
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier.
This gives us the ﬁrst order conditions:
LE = 0 = UE(E
∗, R∗)− λ∗pE
LR = 0 = UR(E
∗, R∗)− λ∗pR
Lλ = 0 = X1 +X2 +X3 +X4 +X5 − pEE∗ − pRR∗
where an asterisk indicates a value that is an optimal solution. We cannot solve these conditions directly, but
we know that the optimal values for education and research can be expressed as functions of the revenue vari-
ables, the price of education, and the price of research. That is, E∗ = E∗(X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, pE , pR), R∗ =
R∗(X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, pE , pR), and λ∗ = λ∗(X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, pE , pR).
Let's assume that we have such a set of solutions. This means that the ﬁrst and second order conditions
are satisﬁed. The second order conditions are:
|H¯1| < 0 and |H¯2| = |H¯| > 0,
where |H¯1| and |H¯2| are the determinants of the ﬁrst and second order border principle minors for the Hessian
matrix associated with the Lagrangian function, respectively. Notice that the second order border principle
minor is just the Hessian matrix itself.
Now we plug the functional forms of our optimal values for research and education back into the ﬁrst
order conditions. This gives us a set of three identities:
0 ≡ UE(E∗(X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, pE , pR), R∗(X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, pE , pR))− λ∗(X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, pE , pR)pE
0 ≡ UR(E∗(X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, pE , pR), R∗(X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, pE , pR))− λ∗(X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, pE , pR)pR
0 ≡ X1 +X2 +X3 +X4 +X5 − pEE∗(X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, pE , pR)− pRR∗(X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, pE , pR).
We can take the partial derivatives of each side of the three identities with respect to one of the revenue
variables. Note that we just choose an arbitrary revenue variable, Xi, because the structure of the budget
constraint will lead to all of the partial derivatives in which we are interested having the same sign. This
gives us a system of three equations in three unknowns. In matrix form, this system is as follows:

UEE UER −pE
UER URR −pR
−pE −pR 0


∂E∗
∂Xi
∂R∗
∂Xi
∂λ∗
∂Xi
 =

0
0
−1

Note that the three by three matrix is simply the Hessian matrix, H. Using Cramer's Rule, we can solve
for ∂E
∗
∂Xi
and ∂R
∗
∂Xi
. For ∂E
∗
∂Xi
we get:
∂E∗
∂Xi
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 UER −pE
0 URR −pR
−1 −pR 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
|H| =
pRUER − pEURR
|H|
For ∂R
∗
∂Xi
we get:
∂R∗
∂Xi
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
UEE 0 −pE
UER 0 −pR
−pE −1 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
|H| =
pEUER − pRUEE
|H|
By the previous assumptions, UER, pE , pR, and |H| are positive and UEE and URR are negative. Thus, both
∂E∗
∂Xi
and ∂R
∗
∂Xi
are positive. This means that an increase in any revenue source will lead to an increase in units
of education and units of research purchased. Since all prices are positive, this means that an increase in any
revenue source will increase spending on research and education.
In addition to allowing us to hypothesize the signs of regression coeﬃcients, the above economic model
also informs the building of the regressions that will be introduced in the next section. In particular, it gives
us the basic regression model framework. In the utility-maximizing model, the choice variables are education
and research. This suggests that these variables should also be the dependent variables in the regressions.
This will give us a set of education regressions, where education spending is the dependent variable. The
same will be true for research. Also, the economic model led to viewing education and research spending as
functions of the diﬀerent revenue categories. This implies that the regressions should have revenue categories
as the independent variables.
It should be noted that this is not the only way to approach the modeling of this scenario. Inherent in both
the economic model above and the regressions that follow is the assumption that revenue structures inform
spending decisions. Revenue variables are treated as givens. Institution spending decisions then naturally
follow based on the given revenue structure. After the modeling is played out, then it is acknowledged that
institutions, in reality, have some measure of control over revenue sources and amounts. I could just have
easily considered a model with revenue categories as the choice variables. This would have led to revenues as
a function of spending and perhaps other variables. The resulting regressions would have revenue variables
as the dependents and spending variables as explanatory variables.
The above economic model gives good initial insight, but cannot tell us everything by itself. In particular,
it does not allow us to discuss the magnitude of the relationships between spending on education and research
and the ﬁve revenue sources. It also does not answer the two major questions in which I am interested: how
are these relationships aﬀected by the control type of the institution and how are these relationships aﬀected
by the passing of time? I will leave analysis of magnitudes until the regressions are introduced. However, I
will try to get some feeling as to what revenue variables should be signiﬁcant in the education and research
regressions by using theory. I will also use theory and higher education trends to get preliminary answers to
my two questions.
To obtain the background for this theoretical discussion, I return to Desrochers et. al (2009) and another
piece by the same authors, Desrochers et. al (2010). Let's consider diﬀerences and similarities based on
institution control type ﬁrst. Starting with education spending, Desrochers et. al (2009) claim that tuition
is related to education spending. This can be attributed to the fact that tuition is technically revenue from
selling educational instruction to students. (Desrochers et. al, 2009) For this reason, it is expected that
tuition will be signiﬁcant for all education regressions, regardless of year or control type. Since state and
local appropriations are a major source of general revenues for public schools, it is reasonable to assume that
they will aﬀect public institution education spending. (Desrochers et. al, 2009) By the same argument, I
hypothesize that private donations and endowments will be related to non-proﬁt education spending.
For the research regressions, the major player is contracts. As noted previously, government contracts
are primarily given for public service or research. This indicates that contracts should be very important
in determining research spending for all institution types and for all years. However, the fact that public
institutions are more restricted by government implies that the relationship should be weaker for public
schools. Public institutions are more likely to receive and accept public service contracts. This means a
smaller proportion of contracts revenue is going into research for public institutions. Desrochers et. al (2010)
expands on the 2009 paper. In particular, it describes cost and revenue trend changes in the period from
1998 to 2008. Since my regressions will be for 1999 and 2008, the 2010 paper is useful for hypothesizing
trend changes. The authors list four major revenue trends over the decade. The ﬁrst trend is that revenues
increased for most institutions, but state and local appropriations and investments were erratic. The volatility
of these measures indicates a potential change in their relationship with education and research spending.
The second revenue trend is that public institutions experienced government funding cuts starting in 2001
and continuing until late 2005. With less local and state appropriations, public schools had to pick up the
slack somehow. As mentioned in Desrochers et. al (2009), this resulted in tuition increases without much
increase in education spending. This implies that tuition became more important for all spending categories,
including education, while state and local appropriations became less important for education spending.
The third trend is that tuition continued to rise at non-proﬁt institutions even though access to private
donations and endowments increased. This seems to indicate increased spending in general. This spending
increase was split between research and education.
The ﬁnal trend is that non-proﬁts tend to provide high amounts of tuition discounting to students while
public institutions actually experienced the situation of higher gross tuition revenues than the "sticker price."
That is, public schools increasingly turned to out-of-state students, which must pay far above sticker price,
in order to increase tuition revenues. This returns us to the increasing importance of tuition for public
institutions. This trend also indicates that tuition revenues are treated diﬀerently based on institution
control type. This further reinforces the potential diﬀerence between non-proﬁt and public institutions when
it comes to tuition driven spending.
Finally, I will compare research and education spending. It has already been mentioned that research
spending increased more than any other category. This increased interest in research should be reﬂected in
the econometrics in the next few sections. If this is the case, we would expect the signiﬁcant coeﬃcients
in the later research regressions to be larger than the same coeﬃcients in the earlier regressions. We would
also expect the research coeﬃcients to be greater than the corresponding education coeﬃcients. We should
also be able to ﬁgure out what possible mix of revenue sources would account for the changes in the relative
importance of education and research.
3 Regressions
3.1 Data
For my empirical analysis, I chose to focus my attention on four-year government (public) and non-proﬁt
research universities as deﬁned by the 2005 Carnegie Classiﬁcations and the Integrated Postsecondary Edu-
cation Data System Database (IPEDS). (IES, 2012 and Carnegie Foundation, 2012) According to the IPEDS
glossary, public institutions are those that are supported mainly by public funds and are controlled by "pub-
licly elected or appointed school oﬃcials." (IES, 2012) According to the IPEDS glossary, private non-proﬁt
institutions are those that cannot provide additional compensation (i.e. beyond wages or rents) to control-
ling oﬃcials for taking on risk. (IES, 2012) The Carnegie Foundation uses principle component analysis and
discriminant analysis to classify universities as research schools. Classiﬁcation is based on level of research
activity as measured by research and development expenditures and doctoral degree conferrals. (Carnegie
Foundation, 2012)
The data I used comes from the Delta Cost Project 20-year matched set. (Delta Project, 2010) The Delta
Cost data span 1987 to 2009. I focused on the period from 1999 to 2008. In this data segment, there are
152 public research institutions and 103 private research institutions. The two major variables of interest
are revenues and spending. In accordance with Desrochers et. al (2009), each of these variables is broken
up into ﬁve categories. Revenues are partitioned into net tuition; state and local appropriations; federal
appropriations and federal, state, and local contracts; private donations, investments, and endowments;
and auxiliary revenues. Spending is split into the following categories: education, research, public service,
auxiliary spending, and scholarships and fellowships. I am focusing on all of the revenue categories but just
two of the spending categories, research and education.
The Delta Cost data variables are expressed in 2009 dollars and reﬂect the dollar amounts spent or
received per full time equivalent student. Full time equivalent student (FTE) is a per institution measure
that reﬂects the eﬀective number of full time students attending the university. For example, two half time
students would be considered one full time student. The reason for dividing the cost and revenue variables
by the FTE measure is to account for diﬀerences in institution size. This is especially important because I
will be comparing public institutions with non-proﬁt institutions. Public institutions have, on average, more
FTE students than non-proﬁts, even though average total operating revenues are similar. (Desrochers et. al,
2009)
Net tuition is revenue from student tuition net of university-provided scholarships and fellowships. State
and local appropriations are funds that come directly from a state or local government and have no speciﬁc
requirements attached. Federal appropriations are like state and local appropriations but come from the
federal government. Federal, state, and local contracts are funds from government that have stipulations on
their use. For example, many contracts are speciﬁcally for research or public service activities. Private dona-
tions come from individuals. These donations are often alumni or local business contributions. Investments
and endowments both refer to invested money that receives a return. These revenue sources are often ﬂexible
and can be used to overcome budget shortfalls.
Private donations, investments, and endowments are grouped together for two reasons. First, reporting
mechanisms for the three revenue sources have changed over time relative to each other. Second, public
universities historically have had much smaller endowments than non-proﬁts. Separating these three revenue
streams would pose problems for comparative research due to the extreme magnitude diﬀerences. Finally,
auxiliary revenues are a conglomeration of revenue sources with the deﬁning feature that they do not directly
relate to the stated mission of the institution. This category includes enterprises such as hospitals, bookstores,
side businesses, and university sponsored clinics and training programs.
Education spending is a large cost for most universities that includes any expenditure that relates to
providing academic instruction. This includes faculty and staﬀ salaries, student services, facility upkeep, and
institutional and academic support. Research refers to activities that are commissioned by an outside or
institutional agency and are intended to create research outcomes. This also includes expenditures related to
research facilities and centers and information technology. Public service activities are intended to provide
non-educational services that beneﬁt people outside of the campus community. This includes services such
as conferences, community service, and broadcasting. Auxiliary spending is simply money that goes towards
the maintenance of the auxiliary revenue sources discussed above. Finally, scholarships and fellowships are
university sponsored awards that are given to students to oﬀset the costs of tuition and living expenses.
3.2 Methodology
The major goal of this subsection is to present and explain my method for comparing non-proﬁt schools'
costs and revenues and public schools' costs and revenues. To begin, the data was segmented based on year
and control. The two years I looked at were 1999 and 2008. The idea here is to capture diﬀerences over time.
1999 and 2008 were chosen because they represent a decade spread and they occurred at similar points in the
business cycle. That is, both years happened near the end of sustained economic growth periods. I wanted
to have a decent time spread but still account for possible diﬀerences in economic condition based on year.
The goal is to detect trend changes over time, not trend changes based on the condition of the economy.
The other data divider, control, refers to whether an institution is non-proﬁt or public. The motivation
for dividing the data in this way is to highlight diﬀerences based on institution control type. In many mixed
markets, (i.e. industries in which more than one of the three economic sectors - non-proﬁt, for-proﬁt, and
government - have signiﬁcant presence) each sector exhibits characteristics that both diﬀerentiate the sector
from its counterparts and provide justiﬁcation for its existence in the market. (Salamon, 1999) For example,
in the market for health care non-proﬁts often beneﬁt from being considered more trustworthy and less
likely to cut corners than for-proﬁts since non-proﬁts cannot be proﬁt maximizers. (Salamon, 1999) This is
important for consumers because most demanders of health care are not doctors and have to trust that the
treatment they are provided is correct and actually helpful. For-proﬁts, on the other hand, often have easier
access to ﬁnancial and other forms of capital because they are proﬁt maximizers. (Salamon, 1999) This allows
them to be on the leading edge in technology, medicine, and treatment processes. This is also important
for consumers because serious conditions or non-routine procedures often require high levels of technology or
brand new treatment methods. A major goal of this econometric study is to determine whether non-proﬁt
and public institutions in higher education exhibit such diﬀerences, and if so, to explain using economic
theory why this occurs and what consequences it has.
The main format for the regressions is a multiple linear regression with one spending variable as the
dependent variable. In particular, I focused on the expenditure categories for education and research. The
independent variables depend on the data segment being considered. The ﬁrst data division considered
was by year only. This led to four regressions, one for each of the following: education spending in 1999,
research spending in 1999, education spending in 2008, and research spending in 2008. The ﬁve revenue
categories are always used as independent variables, but for these regressions there are also a dummy variable
corresponding to control and each of the dummy-revenue category interaction variables. The second division
was by control only. As expected, all revenue variables are still used as independents, but now there are
a dummy corresponding to year and the interaction variables again. There are four regressions here as
well: education spending for non-proﬁts, research spending for non-proﬁts, education spending for public
institutions, and research spending for public institutions. The two regression types above will collectively
be called the large regressions. The ﬁnal division is by both year and control and these regressions will be
referred to as the small regressions. Dummy variables are not needed since the qualitative diﬀerences in which
I am interested are accounted for. There are eight regressions for this data division, one for each combination
of expenditure category (education or research), year (1999 or 2008), and control type (non-proﬁt or public).
There are a few notes to make here. First, dummy variables are structured as follows. For the year
variable, a value of zero means 1999 and a value of one means 2008. For the control variable, a value of
zero means non-proﬁt and a value of one means public. This means that non-proﬁts in 1999 are considered
the base case. Starting in 1999 makes sense because I want to investigate changes over time. The reason
why non-proﬁts are used as the basis for comparison is a little more complicated. One might expect public
universities to be the starting point. The reason why I did not go this direction is because I wanted to focus
on how being constrained by government might alter public universities' decision-making. Higher education
as an industry shares many similarities with the non-proﬁt sector in other markets, so I used non-proﬁt as a
base line to highlight diﬀerences in public institution behavior. (Salamon, 1999)
The second note deals with the decision to divide the data in the above ways. For this kind of analysis,
one choice would be to not separate the data and run two regressions, one for research and one for education,
with both the control and year dummy variables. The reason I did not do this was because it would have
oversaturated the model. After accounting for all of the revenue categories, the dummy variables, and the
possible cross eﬀects, very few interesting trends would have remained. If my only goals were to predict
university spending and analyze coeﬃcient diﬀerences based on year and control, then this method would
be ideal. Instead, I am most interested in the actual relationships between revenues, year, and control type
and spending, with diﬀerences merely being a precursor to the overall goal. By running both combined and
separated regressions, I can still analyze model diﬀerences while keeping information about signiﬁcance levels
intact.
Finally, there are a couple of important methodological notes to make. The ﬁrst deals with the state and
local appropriations variable for non-proﬁt institutions. This variable was largely unreported for non-proﬁts
in the Delta Cost data set. Rather than just scrapping the variable, which I expected to be highly signiﬁcant
for public institutions, I supplemented this variable using average proportions. First, I calculated the average
proportion of non-proﬁt revenues that comes from state and local appropriations for the institutions for which
I did have data. I then multiplied this proportion by each unreported institution's total revenue and recorded
that number as the level of state and local appropriations for that institution. Although this data should be
approached with caution, the average proportion with which I was dealing was very small.
The second methodological note regards treatment of other missing data. As with most data sets of this
magnitude, the Delta Cost data set is not complete. Some values were unreported. The way I dealt with
missing data was to pre-delete institutions that had missing entries. This was done by looking at each data
segment for the small regressions separately. For each of the eight segments, if an institution was missing
one or more of the six variables (i.e. either research or education spending and the ﬁve revenue variables)
then that institution was manually deleted from that segment. This means that each segment was based on
slightly diﬀerent sets of institutions. This does not interfere with interpretation of the aggregate data, but it
is worth noting since it leads to each regression being based on a diﬀerently sized sample.
4 Results
With the econometric framework set, now I will discuss how the analysis itself was carried out and the
results. As a note, all statistical analysis was carried out with the open source statistics program R. Also,
all point and interval estimation was done using the small regressions. The large regressions were used to
detect statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences in coeﬃcients between the small regressions. For my purposes, a
coeﬃcient estimate or a diﬀerence between coeﬃcients is considered statistically signiﬁcant if it has a p-value
less than 0.05. In other words, I used a signiﬁcance level of 0.05 as my decision rule. While this method is
a bit clunky, it gives clear yes and no answers to the questions in which I am interested. That is, whether
education and research can be explained by speciﬁc revenue categories and whether relationships diﬀer over
time and between non-proﬁt and public institutions. However, conﬁdence intervals are considered where
more explanation or deeper insight is required.
4.1 Education Regressions
Let's look at the small education regressions ﬁrst. Using the summary tables, I cataloged the regression
coeﬃcients including whether each coeﬃcient was signiﬁcant or not. These results are contained in Table
(1). As expected, education spending depends on many factors. Note that regardless of control type or year,
education spending can be thought of as a function of four of the ﬁve revenue categories. That is, four of
the ﬁve revenue variables are signiﬁcant in each regression. In particular, tuition and auxiliary revenues are
signiﬁcant for all small education regressions. For non-proﬁts in 1999 and 2008, revenues from government
contracts and revenues from private donations, endowments, and investments are also signiﬁcant. For public
institutions, the signiﬁcant variables depend on the year. For 1999, all variables are signiﬁcant except
contracts. For 2008, all variables are signiﬁcant except private donations, endowments, and investments.
For non-proﬁts, it is logical that the only not signiﬁcant variable is state and local appropriations. This
revenue category is by far the smallest revenue source for non-proﬁts throughout the decade. (Desrochers
et. al, 2009) It makes sense that local and state appropriations do not factor prominently into explaining
education spending, the major spending focus for institutions. For public institutions in 2008, the same
argument could be advanced for private donations and endowments. This was the smallest revenue source
for public institutions throughout the decade. (Desrochers et. al, 2009) The insigniﬁcance of contracts for
public institutions in 1999 can be explained by the fact that contracts are typically for public service or
research. The reasons behind why the contracts variable is signiﬁcant in the other three regressions are more
mysterious. This is a question I will not attempt to answer in this paper, and may be a good avenue for
future research.
Now consider the coeﬃcients themselves. All signiﬁcant coeﬃcients in the four regressions are positive.
This means that an increase in any revenue source will lead to no change or an expected increase in education
spending regardless of year or control type. Furthermore, all of the coeﬃcients but one are signiﬁcant in each
of the four regressions. This is very similar to the results from the economic model that was developed in the
background and theory section of this paper. In that model, all coeﬃcients were hypothesized to be positive.
The slight diﬀerence might be attributable to the simplicity of the model. It should also be noted that the
variable that was not statistically signiﬁcant for the non-proﬁt regressions was based on data that I had to
supplement due to missing values. This likely has something to do with the small discrepancy between the
economic model and the regressions.
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Now we look at the values of coeﬃcients and simultaneously consider diﬀerences in coeﬃcient values by
year and control type. In order to do this, the large education regressions must be utilized. These can be seen
in Table (2) and Table (3). It needs to be noted that the coeﬃcient estimates that are being considered are
point estimates. That is, the coeﬃcients are being approximated by one value. Conﬁdence interval estimates
were also constructed. These give a range of values wherein the actual coeﬃcient values would likely lie.
What point estimates buy us is a single value that can be cited and used in analysis. What we lose is the
fact that two point estimates can look very diﬀerent on the surface but still be statistically similar. When
a situation like this occurs, we will look at the conﬁdence intervals to get further insight. The conﬁdence
intervals are in Table (4) and Table (5).
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It also needs to be noted that the large regressions do not take into account the statistical signiﬁcance
or lack thereof of variables in the small regressions. They use dummy variables to measure the diﬀerence
between coeﬃcient estimates regardless of whether the coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant or not. Because of this,
the following guidelines will be in eﬀect. If a variable is not signiﬁcant in two regressions that are being
compared, then the assumption is that the corresponding coeﬃcients are both zero, and thus not diﬀerent.
If both coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant, then the large regression is used to determine if the point estimates are
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent. Any oddities or discrepancies are analyzed further by using the conﬁdence intervals.
If the coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant in one regression but not in the other, then the conﬁdence intervals and the
large regressions are used while keeping in mind that the coeﬃcient is assumed to be zero in the regression
where it is not signiﬁcant.
Regression Variable 2.5% 97.5%
np.edreg1999
(Intercept) -1.24E+07 3.21E+07
np.tuition1999.ed 8.73E-01 1.22E+00
np.statelocapp1999.ed -7.67E+00 5.60E+00
np.contracts1999.ed 1.45E-01 5.72E-01
np.priv1999.ed 5.41E-02 2.11E-01
np.auxrev1999.ed 4.51E-02 2.20E-01
np.researchreg1999
(Intercept) -2.56E+07 3.60E+05
np.tuition1999.research -7.33E-02 1.13E-01
np.statelocapp1999.research -6.41E-02 6.82E+00
np.contracts1999.research 7.52E-01 9.74E-01
np.priv1999.research 4.91E-02 1.30E-01
np.auxrev1999.research -3.92E-02 5.17E-02
pub.edreg1999
(Intercept) -1.43E+07 1.38E+07
pub.tuition1999.ed 5.25E-01 8.77E-01
pub.statelocapp1999.ed 6.37E-01 8.75E-01
pub.contracts1999.ed -2.48E-02 3.91E-01
pub.priv1999.ed 5.30E-02 8.39E-01
pub.auxrev1999.ed 2.11E-02 1.26E-01
pub.researchreg1999
(Intercept) -7.11E+06 1.49E+07
pub.tuition1999.research -2.13E-02 2.55E-01
pub.statelocapp1999.research -8.75E-02 9.92E-02
pub.contracts1999.research 7.68E-01 1.09E+00
pub.priv1999.research 2.38E-01 8.56E-01
pub.auxrev1999.research -6.02E-02 2.18E-02
Table 4: Conﬁdence intervals for the coeﬃcient estimates for the 1999 small regressions
First consider non-proﬁts in 1999 and 2008. The only statistically signiﬁcant change over time occurs for
private donations and endowments. For the 1999 regression the coeﬃcient is .132, and for the 2008 regression
the coeﬃcient is .313. This translates into a roughly 18 cents education spending increase per dollar of private
donations and endowments. For tuition, the coeﬃcient is roughly 1.00 in both regressions. This one to one
relationship makes sense because tuition is revenue from the sale of an educational institution's main product,
education. Since non-proﬁts are subject to the non-distribution constraint, this revenue must go back into
Regression Variable 2.5% 97.5%
np.edreg2008
(Intercept) -4.39E+07 4.02E+07
np.tuition2008.ed 8.47E-01 1.20E+00
np.statelocapp2008.ed -1.64E+00 9.62E-01
np.contracts2008.ed 4.24E-01 8.36E-01
np.priv2008.ed 2.40E-01 3.86E-01
np.auxrev2008.ed 5.66E-02 1.91E-01
np.researchreg2008
(Intercept) -2.62E+07 2.15E+07
np.tuition2008.research -1.15E-01 6.77E-02
np.statelocapp2008.research -1.60E-01 1.15E+00
np.contracts2008.research 9.95E-01 1.20E+00
np.priv2008.research 5.64E-02 1.30E-01
np.auxrev2008.research -1.80E-02 4.98E-02
pub.edreg2008
(Intercept) -3.21E+07 1.46E+07
pub.tuition2008.ed 6.25E-01 9.06E-01
pub.statelocapp2008.ed 5.21E-01 7.92E-01
pub.contracts2008.ed 2.79E-01 5.37E-01
pub.priv2008.ed -2.26E-01 2.15E-01
pub.auxrev2008.ed 2.12E-02 1.15E-01
pub.researchreg2008
(Intercept) -1.75E+07 1.61E+07
pub.tuition2008.research 6.29E-02 2.65E-01
pub.statelocapp2008.research -1.01E-01 9.36E-02
pub.contracts2008.research 7.19E-01 9.04E-01
pub.priv2008.research 3.26E-02 3.49E-01
pub.auxrev2008.research -3.66E-02 3.08E-02
Table 5: Conﬁdence intervals for the coeﬃcient estimates for the 2008 small regressions
university spending in some manner. Spending a dollar on education for each dollar of education related
revenue (i.e. tuition) is consistent with the education driven mission of a non-proﬁt university. Auxiliary
revenues oﬀer a similarly uncomplicated comparison. In both years, approximately 13 cents of spending on
education occurred for each dollar of auxiliary revenue.
Since state and local appropriations were insigniﬁcant in both regressions, the last comparison of interest
is for contracts. According to the non-proﬁt large education regression, there was no change over time for
contracts. However, the coeﬃcient estimates show an almost .30 spread at .358 and .630. Looking at the
conﬁdence intervals in Table (4) and Table (5), it can be seen that the overlap is relatively small. It is
not enough to declare a statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence, but it is worth noting. Assuming that the true
coeﬃcients in each year are the same, that shared value will likely be somewhere between .424 and .572.
For public institutions in 1999 and 2008, there are no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences. For tuition,
the coeﬃcients are both between .70 and .77. For auxiliary revenues, both coeﬃcients are around .07. This
means public institutions in 1999 and 2008 spent just over 70 cents on education for each dollar of tuition
and around seven cents per dollar of auxiliary revenues. For the other three variables, it is more informative
to look at the conﬁdence intervals because the point estimates are fairly diﬀerent despite being statistically
similar. We will look at the areas of overlap. For state and local appropriations, this range is from .637 to
.792. The range for contracts is .279 to .391, and the range for private donations and endowments is .053 to
.214. Assuming that the true coeﬃcients really are the same in 1999 and 2008, the above intervals give the
likely range of values for the true coeﬃcients.
Next, we use the 1999 large education regression to compare non-proﬁt and public institutions in 1999.
The only signiﬁcant diﬀerence occurs for tuition. Non-proﬁts spend about 35 cents more on education per
dollar of tuition than public institutions. The point estimates for the auxiliary revenues coeﬃcient are similar
and fall between seven to thirteen cents of spending per dollar of revenue. For the other coeﬃcients, we turn
to the conﬁdence intervals again. The ﬁrst trend to note is that some conﬁdence interval estimates are very
wide and entirely contain their counterparts. For example, the state and local appropriations interval for
non-proﬁts entirely contains the one for public institutions. In addition, the non-proﬁt interval is very wide,
ranging from -7.67 to 5.60. These trends indicate that the true coeﬃcient estimates are likely diﬀerent, even
though the large regression indicates otherwise. It should also be noted that the point estimate for public
institutions is .756 while the non-proﬁt coeﬃcient is assumed to be zero since it is not signiﬁcant.
For private donations and endowments, the public conﬁdence interval contains the non-proﬁt one. Unlike
state and local appropriations, this variable is signiﬁcant in both regressions. Also, the public interval is not
incredibly wide. This leads me to conclude that the true shared value for this coeﬃcient likely lies in the
non-proﬁt interval of .054 to .211. The contracts variable, on the other hand, is not signiﬁcant in the public
regression. The assumption is that its value is zero. The large regression does not take this into account, so
we turn to the conﬁdence intervals. The non-proﬁt interval is .145 to .572. This interval does not contain
zero, so we conclude that the coeﬃcient is actually diﬀerent in the two regressions. Additionally, I will use
the point estimate of .358 to describe the non-proﬁt coeﬃcient.
For the 2008 large education regression, most of the 1999 trends apply. The tuition coeﬃcient is still
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent, by roughly the same amount. The auxiliary revenues coeﬃcient is similar in both
regressions and the values are similar to those in 1999. State and local appropriations exhibit the same
trends as in 1999. The diﬀerences from 1999 occur in the contracts coeﬃcient and the private donations
and endowments coeﬃcient. The private donations coeﬃcient is now statistically diﬀerent between public
and nonproﬁt. Public institutions do not base education spending on private donations and endowments
while non-proﬁts spend between 42 and 57 cents per dollar of revenue. Finally, the contracts coeﬃcient is
technically not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent between public and non-proﬁt at the ﬁve percent level, but it is close.
Looking at the conﬁdence intervals we see that the non-proﬁt interval is .424 to .836 and the public interval
is .279 to .537. There is some overlap, but it is very small. If the coeﬃcients really are the same, then the
true value will most likely be between .424 and .537.
4.2 Research Regressions
Next, we will look at the research regressions. We begin with the small regressions. These can be seen in Table
(6). An interesting trend is immediately apparent. Both the private donations and endowments variable and
the contracts variable are signiﬁcant in every regression regardless of year or control type. In fact, the 2008
public regression is the only one with another signiﬁcant variable, tuition. This leads to two observations.
First, non-proﬁt institutions' research spending is entirely explained by donations, endowments, investments,
and government contracts, and this trend has not changed over time. Second, something likely occurred in
public, but not non-proﬁt, institutions over the decade that led to tuition becoming an important factor in
research spending.
The ﬁrst observation is not too surprising. Government contracts are restricted revenues that must be put
largely toward a pre-speciﬁed purpose. This purpose is typically research or public service. For non-proﬁts,
public service contracts are less common than they are for public institutions. (Desrochers, et. al, 2009) This
means that the majority of contracts revenues must go toward research. As for endowments and donations, I
will return to the argument made for education spending. Donations and endowments are typically restricted
to particular purposes, but those purposes can be just about anything. It is not unwarranted to think that
part of these revenues would have been given for the sake of conducting research. For example, a former
doctoral recipient or a business may donate to further a speciﬁc type of research.
The second observation is more open to interpretation. My theory is that a major change in revenue
structure occurred over the past decade at most public institutions. That change was a decrease in state and
local government funding for public schools. At the same time, tuition increased at the majority of higher
education institutions. This means that tuition revenues have become a larger proportion of public institution
budgets. (Desrochers et. al, 2010) With the combination of increasing promotion of research and shifting
budget structures, it is feasible that public institutions tried to make up the diﬀerence in research funding by
using tuition revenues. This is supported by the trend seen earlier. That is, not all tuition revenue at public
universities is put toward education. This leaves extra for other spending categories, such as research.
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Next we will consider the coeﬃcients themselves. First note that all signiﬁcant coeﬃcients are positive.
As with the education regressions, this implies that increases in revenue will lead to no change in research
spending or an increase in spending. This result is somewhat diﬀerent from the education regressions,
however, since far fewer coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant. Three of the four regressions only have two signiﬁcant
(i.e. conclusively nonzero) coeﬃcients. The economic model that was developed in the theory section does
not account for this. One possible explanation for this is that the assumption that research and education
are complementary is incorrect. If education and research were actually substitutes, then this would allow
for zero-valued and even negative coeﬃcients. Another explanation is that the model was too simple to
capture some of the subtleties, but still captures the overall idea. Notice that there were no signiﬁcant
negative coeﬃcients. The model captured this idea, but perhaps was too simple to account for zero-valued
coeﬃcients.
Now we look at the values of coeﬃcients and simultaneously consider diﬀerences in coeﬃcient values by
year and control type. In order to do this, the large research regressions must be utilized. These can be seen
in Table (7) and Table (8). We begin by considering non-proﬁts in 1999 and 2008. For private donations
and endowments, there is no statistically signiﬁcant change in the coeﬃcient estimates. The estimate in
both years is around .09, or roughly nine cents of research spending for each dollar of private donations and
endowments. For contracts, there is a signiﬁcant increase over time. For 1999 the coeﬃcient is .863, and for
2008 the coeﬃcient is 1.10. This is an increase of over twenty cents of spending per dollar of revenue. This
increase can likely be attributed to the increasing importance of research. (Desrochers et. al, 2009)
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Repeating the same analysis for public institutions, a surprising trend arises. There are no signiﬁcant
changes over time. However, the point estimates do appear diﬀerent. The estimates dropped for 2008. The
value dropped by 12 cents for contracts and 35 cents for private donations and endowments. This calls for
an investigation of the conﬁdence intervals. Looking at Table (4) and Table (5), it can be seen that the 2008
conﬁdence intervals are lower than the 1999 intervals. There is some overlap of the intervals, which explains
why the point estimates are not statistically diﬀerent. With contracts, the overlap is fairly large, so the true
coeﬃcient values could feasibly be similar. With private donations and endowments, however, caution should
be taken. The overlap is relatively small. Its range is roughly .11, while the ranges of the entire conﬁdence
intervals are approximately .61 and .32.
Now let's compare non-proﬁt and public institutions. For 1999, the private donations and endowments
coeﬃcient is statistically diﬀerent for non-proﬁt and public institutions. The diﬀerence is fairly stark at nine
cents of research spending per dollar of revenue for non-proﬁts versus about 55 cents per dollar for public
schools. This can partly be attributed to the aforementioned diﬀerence in revenue structure at public and
non-proﬁt universities. Non-proﬁts receive a hefty proportion of their budgets from private donations and
endowments while public institutions receive a proportionally much smaller amount of this revenue source.
Because of this, non-proﬁts use private donations and endowments to cover some operating costs. This means
that they will have less left over for research. In 1999, public institutions still received much of their operating
budgets from state and local appropriations. This left donations and endowments revenues open for use in
research spending.
Over the past decade, the above relationship changed. By 2008, public institutions received more dona-
tions and were victim to funding cuts by government. This likely explains the fact that in the 2008 large
research regression, the private donations and endowments coeﬃcients are no longer statistically diﬀerent.
Instead, the contracts coeﬃcients became signiﬁcantly diﬀerent for public and non-proﬁt universities. In
particular, the non-proﬁt coeﬃcient is higher. Contracts have a roughly one to one relationship with research
spending for non-proﬁts while public institutions only spend about 81 cents on research per dollar of contract
revenues. This trend can be coupled with the increase in the contracts coeﬃcient for non-proﬁts between
1999 and 2008. Public institution spending patterns for this particular relationship did not change while
non-proﬁt spending patterns did change in the positive direction.
The ﬁnal pattern in the 2008 large research regression is the signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the tuition
coeﬃcients. For non-proﬁts, this coeﬃcient is not statistically signiﬁcant, so the assumption is that the
coeﬃcient is not diﬀerent from zero. For public institutions, the coeﬃcient is .164. This means that roughly
sixteen cents of research spending results from each dollar of tuition revenue. The reasons for this trend were
discussed previously. In short, public institutions have some tuition revenue that does not go to education
while non-proﬁts put most of their tuition revenue back into education.
5 Consequences and Implications
In order to fully appreciate the results above, some context is needed. In particular, the implications of the
cost-revenue relationships above need to be described. I will ﬁrst consider research and education spending
separately. Then I will analyze both in the context of changing revenue structures.
I will begin by recapping the revenue structure changes. In the past decade, most revenue categories have
increased in magnitude. (Desrochers et. al, 2010) Tuition, private donations and endowments, and auxiliary
revenues have increased fairly steadily. Contracts have been more volatile, but have generally increased.
State and local appropriations are the notable exception. These have decreased for public institutions and
have remained almost negligible for non-proﬁts. (Desrochers et. al, 2010)
For non-proﬁt education spending, this means a general increase in education spending. For public
institutions, results are more mixed. Depending on the magnitude of the state and local appropriations
decrease, a particular public institution might experience a decrease in education spending. This is not
unlikely given that the tuition coeﬃcient in 1999 and 2008 is similar to the state and local appropriations
coeﬃcient in both years. This also has an interesting implication. That is, as far as education spending goes,
tuition revenue and state and local appropriations aﬀect spending in the same way at public institutions.
This may be one reason why public schools tend to replace lost government funding using tuition increases.
For research spending, the aforementioned trends imply a general increase in spending for both institution
types. One important trend to discuss is the signiﬁcance of tuition in the 2008 public regression. This means
public schools will now spend some money on research for each additional dollar of tuition revenue. In other
words, education now directly ﬁghts research for tuition funds.
Now I will consider research and education together. In particular, I am interested in how slight changes
in revenue structure will aﬀect education and research spending at non-proﬁt and public institutions in 1999
and 2008. Let's ﬁrst consider 1999 as the baseline. For non-proﬁts, education spending can be increased by
increases in tuition, contracts, private donations and endowments, and auxiliary revenues. Research spending
can be increased by increases in contracts and private donations and endowments. In 1999, the best way
to increase education spending was to increase tuition. Each dollar of tuition translated into a dollar of
education spending and no increase in research. As expected, the best way to increase research spending
was to increase contracts. Here, an additional dollar of contracts revenue led to about 86 cents of research
spending.
It can be seen that in 1999, the non-proﬁt education-research tension was not incredibly strong. In
two of the revenue categories, auxiliary revenues and tuition, increases do not aﬀect research but increase
education spending. For private donations and endowments, the education coeﬃcient is slightly higher than
the research one, indicating that increases in this revenue source would not heavily favor research spending.
In fact, education spending would increase about four cents more than research spending for each additional
dollar of private donations and endowments. For contracts, the research coeﬃcient is higher. However, since
most contract revenues have to go toward speciﬁc purposes, usually research or public service, this is not
particularly surprising. In fact, it is interesting that contracts actually generate between 42 and 57 cents of
education spending despite not being intended for that purpose.
Now let's consider research and education at non-proﬁts in 2008. The signiﬁcant revenue sources for
both spending categories have not changed. In addition, tuition is still the best way to increase education
spending, and contracts are the best way to increase research spending. Tuition still exhibits a one to one
relationship with education. Contracts now also exhibit a one to one relationship with research, implying an
even stronger relationship than in 1999. Somewhat surprisingly, this trend is the only one that is favorable to
research. The relationships for education and research spending and auxiliary revenues and state and local
appropriations remained unchanged. The private donations and endowments coeﬃcient actually increased
for education but did not change for research. Now instead of a four cent diﬀerence, there is a roughly 21
cent diﬀerence.
These trends seem to indicate that education actually made gains versus research. The reality is that
research spending increases outpaced education spending increases. (Desrochers et. al, 2010) This means
that contracts are being more favored as a revenue source. This is compounded by the fact that the contract-
research relationship increased between 1999 and 2008. Still, this is not all bad news. Education spending
still rises between 42 and 57 cents for each dollar of contract revenues. In addition, contracts are very rigid
as a revenue source and are dependent on government funding. This is promising for education at non-proﬁts
since all other revenue sources either favor education spending, or in the case of state and local appropriations,
lead to no change in either expenditure category.
For public institutions in 1999, education spending could be increased by increases in tuition, state and
local appropriations, private donations and endowments, and auxiliary revenues. Research spending could
be increased by increases in contracts and private donations and endowments. Like for non-proﬁts, research
spending is best improved by increasing contracts. A little less than a dollar of research spending is generated
with each dollar of contract revenues. Education spending is best increased by raising tuition revenues or
state and local appropriations. A dollar increase in either translates to about 70 cents of education spending.
For public institutions, the education-research tension in 1999 is stronger than for non-proﬁts. On the
one hand, tuition, state and local appropriations, and auxiliary revenues improve education spending but
not research. At the same time, contracts do not aﬀect education spending but greatly increase research
spending. Also, private donations and endowments contribute between 24 and 35 cents per dollar to research
spending but only 5 to 21 cents to education. Still, at this time private donations and endowments were very
low in public institutions, and state and local appropriations were on the rise. (Desrochers et. al 2009 and
Desrochers et. al, 2010)
Now we look forward to 2008. For education, not much has changed. Tuition and state and local
appropriations are still the most important revenue sources for increasing education spending. One new trend
is that private donations and endowments are no longer signiﬁcant and contracts now are. The new contracts
contribution is comparable to the 1999 private donations and endowments contribution. For research, the
contracts and private donations and endowments coeﬃcients are the same, but tuition is now signiﬁcant.
Each dollar of tuition translates into about 16 cents of research spending.
This has mixed consequences for research and education. On the one hand, education spending is now
boosted by contracts, diminishing the eﬀect of increased contracts revenue on the education-research tension.
On the other hand, tuition increases now increase research spending, and private donations and endowments
no longer contribute to education. This could be a problem for two reasons. The ﬁrst is that state and
local appropriations are falling in public schools due to the recent recession. (Desrochers et. al, 2010) As
noted previously, public institutions tend to increase tuition when this occurs. Tuition now supports research
spending as well while state and local appropriations only boost education spending. This tradeoﬀ means
more research spending increases relative to education. The second reason is that donations, endowments, and
investments at public institutions may increase as public schools seek new funding sources. This potential
increase in alternate funding for public schools would mean more spending on research with no increase
in education spending. In short, the pursuit of alternatives to state and local appropriations will lead to
increased importance of research relative to education at public institutions.
6 Conclusion
The education-research tension in the ﬁeld of higher education is an interesting example of mission drift in
an entitre industry. It is also a prime display of diﬀerences between public and non-proﬁt institutions. In
particular, public institutions have more greatly suﬀered mission drift due to a combination of decreased
state and local appropriations, tuition hikes, and an increasing tendency to invest tuition revenue in research
as well as education. Non-proﬁts, on the other hand, have faired better in sticking to the higher education
mission of education.
In this paper, I focused in on education and research spending as they relate to revenue sources. This
led to linear regressions that model these relationships. The tension between research and education was
highlighted by these models. For public institutions, private donations and endowments and contracts favor
research spending, and tuition contributes to research spending. For non-proﬁts, research spending is only
favored by contracts. For both institution types, if the goal is increased education spending, tuition revenue
increases are highly important. Public institutions also receive large education gains from increased state and
local appropriations, while non-proﬁts receive large gains from increased private donations and endowments.
The are a wide variety of directions for future research. In particular, the analysis in this paper could be
repeated for the other three spending categories. This would allow for a more complete discussion of revenue-
cost trends. In addition, more years could be considered and non-research institutions could be included. It
might be interesting to consider the eﬀect of institution focus (i.e. research, liberal arts, community college,
vocational, etc.) on spending and revenue relationships. My hope is that this paper will promote further
conversation and research on how revenues and spending are intimately linked in higher education and how
these relationships diﬀer based on institution types.
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